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INTRODUCTION 
The most common premise concerning Russian foreign policy post-cold war is the 
assumption that its primary focus has been the restoration of the country’s influence in 
international affairs (Kanet, 2007; Trenin, 2011; Tsygankov, 2005, Stent, 2014). Following 
a realist approach, it is possible to claim that the quest for a ‘great power’ with global 
interests and the ability to protect them has been the cornerstone of Russian Foreign policy 
for centuries (Tsygankov, 2012). Decisions made by the Russian leadership across last two 
years at the time of writing, including undeclared war in Ukraine and declared war in Syria, 
seem to fit perfectly into that narrative since the country was trying desperately in that 
period to defend its borders from threats of terrorism and hostile military alliances (i.e 
NATO). Moreover, a realist perspective encompasses the matters of prestige that are 
traditionally in the domain of a constructivist paradigm of international relations. If the 
Russian leadership considers status as a means of soft power to promote its agenda in the 
international arena, then it is natural that foreign policy decision-makers seek to gain this 
valuable resource at all costs. It is possible to argue about the continuity of choices and to 
claim that the current Russian leadership— being as restrained by a ‘contradiction between 
overcoming economic backwardness and defending porous frontiers’ (Rieber, 2007, 225) 
as Tsarist and Soviet rulers had been in their foreign policy— has chosen the hard line in 
their foreign policy. However, a realist approach can be considered as an oversimplification 
for the investigation of Russian foreign policy under the Putin regime.  
The paper argues that a foreign policy driven exclusively by domestic needs has 
been conducted over a period of 16 years. In order to defend this hypothesis, this article 
suggests a close examination of the latest National Security strategy adopted on the 31st of 
December 2015 in the context of trends of internal development within the country.  
This article is structured in the following way. The first section will present an 
analysis of the updated security strategy doctrine, including the differences from the 
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previous edition. The analysis points to a discrepancy between the doctrine’s mostly 
defensive nature oriented towards the regime’s domestic security, and claims of great power 
status against the background of decisive, if not aggressive, foreign policy and the country’s 
deteriorating economic development.  The second section is divided into subsections, 
which will cover the relationship between status theory in international relations and the 
incentives of the Russian elite to pursue ‘great power’ status. The final section proposes a 
possible explanation of the paradox discussed during the discourse analysis of the strategy 
doctrine. This article concludes by providing a coherent argument on the incentives of 
modern Russian foreign policy, which cannot be assessed either by a purely realist or purely 
constructivist approach. 
I. THE PARADOXES OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DOCTRINE 
The National Security strategy doctrine is one of several documents that defines Russian 
foreign policy by putting it in the broader context of security, both external and internal. 
On 31st December 2015, the fourth redaction of this document was issued. Whereas the 
previous doctrine appeared in 2009 after the Russian – Georgian war and was designed to 
remain in force until 2020, the recent strategy was issued against the background of the war 
in Eastern Ukraine and a deepening crisis in the relationship between Russia and the West. 
The very fact that a strategy intended to last 11 years was nevertheless revised is what leads 
to the conclusion that some fundamental adjustments were introduced. 
The new strategy doctrine only partially maintains the security narratives present in 
the previous version. By the doctrine’s definition, national security embraces the ‘protection 
of an individual, society and state from both foreign and domestic threats’ (art. 6)1.  It is 
exactly the same definition from 2009.  However, first major differences appear shortly 
thereafter. Following the previous document, the strategy proposes a broad understanding 
of security. In particular, it includes ‘primarily the state, social, informational, ecological, 
economic, transport, energy security, and security of the individual’ (art.6). In contrast to 
the short definition, such a framing of national security puts the well-being of the state as 
the top priority, with consideration for individual security falling last on the list. Unlike in 
the 2009 version, where there was no such contradiction since the promotion of the 
                                                        
1 All citations from the 2015 Strategy are taken from its official publication on “Rossiyskaya Gaseta” 
webpage and are accompanied with () brackets. 
Accessed (26.01.2016): http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html 
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constitutional rights of an individual was placed first upon the list of objectives {art. 6}.2 
At the same time, in both strategies there is a completely unquantifiable element of ‘spiritual’ 
security. In 2009, it was stated that ‘Russian traditional ideals, spirituality and proper attitude 
towards historical memory [are reviving]’ {art. 1}, and the 2015 document proclaims this 
thesis as well (art. 11). 
In contrast to the previous strategy, the 2015 redaction is much more moderate in 
evaluating the successes of the country in all areas except foreign policy. In 2009, its authors 
claimed nothing less than that the country ‘has managed to overcome the consequences of 
the systemic political and socio-economic crisis of the late XXth century’ {art. 1}. In 2015, 
as the main accomplishment of the county’s development, it is suggested that the country 
has demonstrated its ability to ‘defend sovereignty, independence, state and territorial 
integrity and compatriots’ rights abroad’ (art. 8). What is more, in comparison to 2009, the 
current strategy is oriented towards the ideas of stability and regime protection rather than 
development. In its first articles, the 2009 strategy set the goal of transforming the nation 
into ‘one of the leading powers judging by the level of technological progress, the quality 
of life of the population, and influence on global processes’ {art. 1}, and to becoming ‘one 
of the leaders in world economy through effective participation in the global division of 
labour, [and] increasing the global competitiveness of the national economy’ {9}. In the 
2015 strategy doctrine, there is no clear image of any future goals. Instead it is focused from 
the very beginning solely on the stability and protection of the country in a dangerous 
external environment. 
The need to protect the country’s stability arises mainly from the threat posed by 
the global West, according to the new document. The new strategy doctrine appears much 
more explicit in this area when compared with the previous edition. Formerly, despite 
existing arguments such as debates about the US anti-missile program and NATO-
enlargement, there was a goal to ‘build equal and strategic partnership with the USA on the 
basis of joint interests’ {18}. In the 2015 strategy doctrine, articles 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18 
(disregarding any talk about economic, social or any other kind of internal development) 
provide an image of the hostile international environment the Russian state has to operate 
in. There is a long list of threats of conflict in modern international relations, according to 
which the main opponent to the Russian Federation is NATO and the USA. First and 
                                                        
2 All citations from the 2009 Strategy are taken from its official publication on “Rossiyskaya Gaseta” 
webpage and are accompanied with {} brackets 
Accessed (26.01.2016) http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia-dok.html 
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foremost, Russia is threatened by ‘the support of the US and EU of the anti-constitutional 
coup d’etat in Ukraine, which led to a deep schism of Ukrainian society and the onset of an 
armed conflict…framed Russia as an enemy among the Ukrainian people 
[and]…transformed Ukraine into a long-term breeding ground of instability in Europe and 
directly on Russian borders’ (art.17). It is particularly emphasized that ‘the practice of 
toppling down legitimate political regimes, provoking instability within a state’ (art.18) is 
becoming more and more widespread.  Accordingly, the question of information security 
becomes of the utmost importance in view of the fact that communication technologies are 
used ‘by some countries’ in order to ‘achieve the geopolitical goals resorting to manipulation 
with public opinion and history falsification’ (art.21).  
In the context of being surrounded by various threats, the following long-term 
strategic interests are formulated in article 30: ‘strengthening of defense capabilities, 
promotion of the constitutional order, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity 
of the Russian Federation; strengthening of political and social stability, development of 
democratic institutions, and improvement of communication between state and civil 
society; promotion of stable demographic development of the country; promotion of social 
stability, promotion of better living-standards and health-care; development of traditional 
spiritual-moral values; increasing the competitiveness of national economy’, and finally the 
‘maintenance of the status of a great power’  (art.30).  
The first peculiar feature of this list is the fact that, except for the last proposition, 
all other strategic interests directly related to foreign policy are presumed to be vectored 
towards internal development and regime stability. What is more, such focus on internal 
development is framed, not in the discourse of global competition or globalization as it was 
formulated in 2009, but in the context of a necessity to defend the regime against threats.  
These threats are defined as mostly external, although hints and links towards internal 
destabilizing forces are present in the text as well. In an analysis of the strategy, links towards 
foreign interference in Russian internal affairs can be found across the entire document. It 
is stated that there are efforts aimed at the ‘destabilization of the internal political and social 
situation in the country, including instigating “color revolutions” and the destruction of 
traditional Russian spiritual and moral values’ (art. 43). What is more ‘measures are taken 
for the prevention and suppression of intelligence and other destructive operations of 
special services and organizations of foreign states that are harmful to national interests; 
acts of terrorism, manifestations of religious radicalism, nationalism, separatism and … to 
protect citizens and society from the destructive informational influence of extremist and 
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terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, and propaganda’ (art. 47). Here it 
should be noted that previously separated discourses of terrorism and foreign propaganda 
are merged and valued as an equal threat. Moreover, a threat is posed by ‘the erosion of 
traditional Russian spiritual-moral values and the weakening of the unity of the 
multinational people of the Russian Federation by external expansion of culture and 
information (including the distribution of low-quality pop-culture products)’ (art. 79) and 
consequently the state should ‘protect the cultural sovereignty … and society from foreign 
ideological expansion’ (art. 82).  
The rejection of any kind of revolution against an authoritarian government has 
been the cornerstone of Russian arguments with Western partners for a decade. In fact, 
‘the consequences of Color Revolutions were regarded by the Russian elite as the result of 
the United States’ and the EU’s foreign policies’ (Gretskiy et al., 2014, 382). In February 
2011, Russian president Dmitrii Medvedev explained the Arab revolutions as having been 
‘instigated by outside forces’ and warned the Russian government: ‘Let's face the truth. 
They have been preparing such a scenario for us, and now they will try even harder to 
implement it’ (Freedman, 2011). Finally, in 2014, in a meeting with his advisory Security 
Council, Vladimir Putin stated explicitly: ‘We see what tragic consequences the wave of so-
called color revolutions led to… for us this is a lesson and a warning. We should do 
everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in Russia’ (Putin. 2014)3. What is 
more, the narrative of ‘national–traitors’ can be considered as the continuation of the 
discourse of ‘the agents of the foreign influence’, which was enforced in the country after 
the first wave of mass protest in Russia in the aftermath of fraudulent parliamentary 
elections in 2011. Against the background of a singular law regarding foreign agents, which 
was introduced on the 20th July 2012 4  and made it nearly impossible for any NGO 
connected with politics to work in the country, the narrative of ‘national-traitors’ was 
introduced in a presidential speech to the Federal Assembly two years after the Crimea 
Annexation. In the new national strategy, this discourse has become a dominant one. 
The second characteristic issue of the new security priorities is the fact that, not 
only has the number of long-term goals formally stated in the strategy increased, but so has 
their ambiguity. The previous version of the security strategy doctrine described only three 
closely interrelated long-term goals: ‘the development of democracy and civil society and 
increasing the competitiveness of the national economy; promotion of the constitutional 
                                                        
3 Reuters. Darya Korsunskays «Putin says Russia must prevent 'color revolution'» 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-security-idUSKCN0J41J620141120 
4 Federal Law of the Russian Federation from 20th July 2012. N 121-ФЗ 
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order, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation; [and] 
transformation of the country into a global power, whose actions are aimed towards the 
maintenance of strategic stability and partner relationships in the context of a multipolar 
world’ {art. 21}. All of these goals support each other and constitute a coherent argument. 
 In the 2015 strategy, however, there are six objectives which contain many 
contradictions with one another. For example, it remains unclear how the ‘promotion of 
political stability’, ‘strengthening of national agreement’, and ‘development of democratic 
institutions’ (which ultimately embeds an element of uncertainty and instability due to the 
intrinsic unpredictability of election results), correlate with each other. In view of the 
previous articles on economic issues – according to which economic development is 
conceptualized in terms of the ability of the country to resist external attempts to influence 
its domestic and foreign policies with the help of sanctions (art. 9, 24) – ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
the ‘improvement of competitiveness of the national economy’ should be achieved remains 
vague. Finally, the concept of the ‘development of traditional spiritual-moral values’ is vague 
as well. It is briefly defined in article 78 as ‘the priority of spiritual values over material ones, 
the protection of human life, rights and liberties, family, creational labor, responsibility 
before the country, moral and collective values, humanism, mercy, justice, mutual 
assistance, historical unity of the people of the Russian Federation and historical continuity.’  
However, even that definition, located 48 articles after the formulation of the long-term 
goals, leaves dozens of possible contradictory interpretations, including, for example, anti-
homosexual rhetoric and return to sharia law. Moreover, returning to the previous point, 
the range of actions from foreign powers that actually pose a threat for national security is 
never precisely defined. Consequently, one can put everything in the framework of ‘other 
destructive actions,’ including any alleged connections with a public protest, should one 
appear. 
Following the long-term strategic resolutions, nine priorities of Russian security are 
subsequently listed. Considering their order as an indication of importance, as determined 
by the authors of the strategy, it is possible to support the main argument of the centrality 
of ‘regime security’ in the strategy. The first two priorities are ‘national defense, [and] state 
and public security’ (art. 31) with the promotion of high living standards, economic growth 
science, culture, ecology and strategic stability being of lesser importance. What is more, in 
the following sections that provide a more detailed explanation of these priorities, there are 
only 5 articles on ‘improving the living standards of the Russian population,’ compared with 
17 concerning defense and the security of the government. This alone adequately signifies 
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the difference in importance attached to the different priorities. It is worth noting that no 
reference to democracy or civil society is found in this list, whereas there are references to 
them in the previous section on long-term national interests. Once again, there is a break 
of logic and an inconsistency between the various parts of the document, which makes it 
initially difficult to determine the true priorities intended by the authors of the document.  
The only proposition which is depicted clearly and is present in all parts of the 
document, even those concerned with the development of human capital or economy, is 
that of regime security. For example, in the section on economic development, the 
following characteristics are used to describe the priorities of the government: ‘the 
strengthening of the currency system and ensuring its sovereignty,’ ‘the implementation of 
a rational import substitution and reduction of dependency on foreign technologies,’ and 
‘the establishment of strategic reserves of raw mineral resources’ (art. 62). Whereas the 
section on ‘improving living standards’ contains an argument on improving ‘the 
development of information infrastructure and the availability of information on various 
aspects of socio-political, economic, and spiritual life’ (art. 53).  
 Consequently, that which helps to develop an understanding of the ambiguity and 
contradictive character of the strategy and its set of long-term goals is the narrative of 
regime security in the international environment of a ‘besieged fortress’, according to which 
the population should unite around the government in order to prevent foreign forces from 
ruining the country. Such a statement is not new for a discourse on Russian foreign policy. 
For example, Stalin’s conception of ‘building socialism in one country’ can be considered a 
predecessor of such a concept. Moreover, a general focus of an authoritarian regime on 
internal security is not a new phenomenon in international relations. Previously in 2010, 
Stephen Blank stated, ‘The Russian experience and overall security policy conforms to the 
pattern discernible in Asian and Third World countries where security is primarily internal 
security’ (Blank, 2010, 181). Furthermore, some researchers consider this phenomenon to 
even be beneficial for particular countries since, ‘without the security of the regime, the 
security of the state is likely to fall into utter despair if not disappear altogether’ (Ayoob, 
2002, 46). However, all one could expect from a regime that is oriented towards internal 
security would be the establishment of peaceful foreign policy without any major attempts 
to challenge the existing structure of international relations. The annexation of Crimea, 
interference in the Syrian conflict, and an aggressive anti-West rhetoric, seem to contradict 
the idea of the supremacy of internal issues over external ones for a regime where ‘the 
proliferation of multiple military forces, intelligence and police forces … often enjoying 
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more resources than do their regular armies, and their governments’ recourse to rent-
seeking, authoritarian and clientelistic policies’ (Blank, 2010, 181). 
At the same time, the doctrine itself contains a possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between the defensive nature of Russian security strategy and its aggressive 
foreign policy. Amidst all long-term proposals, there is one which describes the relationship 
between Russia and the rest of the world, although it has been formulated in a vague 
manner: the ‘maintenance of the status of a great power’.  In 2009, the objective was to 
become one of the leading world powers, whereas in 2015, only the ‘status’ of such is 
necessary. Consequently, Russian foreign policy is not aimed towards a purpose that can be 
assessed or measured, such as the position of the country as one of the leading world 
economies or the goal to overcome the GDP per capita level of Portugal. On the contrary, 
it is oriented towards what is essentially only a vague idea of ‘status’. This orientation is 
what leads to a discussion about the role of a country’s status and image in international 
relations in regards to regime security, as well as the peculiarities of foreign and domestic 
policy framing in the current Russian Federation.  
II. STATUS THEORY AND MODERN RUSSIA 
Following the basic constructivist argument of Alexander Wendt (1999), the social world 
can be perceived as chiefly ‘made of and driven by ideas.’ Status has always been considered 
an important element of great power and there is a vast corpus of literature on this question 
(Onea 2014; Paul et al., 2014; Steele, 2008; Wolf, 2011; Wood, 2013). A good summary of 
the knowledge on status in international relations can be found in Volgy, Corbetta, Grant, 
and Baird’s article ‘Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics.’  
According to Volgy et al., an acquisition of high status recognition among other countries 
matters in three different ways. Firstly, a country with such status can expect to be visible 
in major international conflicts and issues. Secondly, high status leads to a deeper 
involvement in international agendas. And finally, such status is an important resource for 
holding office (Volgy et al., 2011, p.10). In the same article, Volgy et al. proposed that Russia 
constitutes a unique category, being a country that believes itself to be a great power without 
all the capacities of one. What is special about Russia is that, in contrast to other over-
achieving status-inconsistent countries that are afraid of losing this status and tend not to 
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take high-risk action (Volgy et al., 2011, p.11-12), Russia clearly conducts highly 
confrontational foreign policy.  
It is universally acknowledged in academic literature that in order to become a great 
power, a state needs something to support such a claim: a combination of military and 
economic resources, as well as co-optive and coercive powers combined with attractiveness 
and recognition by other Great powers (Levy, 1981; Neumann, 2008; Nye, 1990). 
According to these criteria, modern Russia has limited reasons to call itself a great power.  
Russia’s military capacities are limited with the exception of its nuclear arsenal. 
Otherwise, Russian armed forces are outdated for modern warfare and are able only to win 
in an open conflict against a weak opponent, such as Georgia in 2008.  Furthermore, the 
Russian economic structure is as unbalanced and dependent on natural oil and gas prices as 
it used to be in the 1990s. Even in the mid-2000s when the country had opportunities to 
develop, ‘Russia remain[ed] overly dependent on the export of raw materials, primarily oil 
and gas. The change in Russia’s political system [had] aggravated the lag between research 
and development in the technology sector, while a brain drain [had] further reduced the 
pool of talent necessary for innovation’ (Rieber, 2007, 259). Despite decades of high-oil 
prices, the Russian population in 2015 is still extremely poor, with 79% having money only 
for basic food and clothes and 9% suffering a shortage of food.5  
What is worse, the Russian economy is desperately underdeveloped even in the 
sphere of natural resource extraction. For example, Russian oil and gas companies have 
completely overlooked the strategic challenge of shale oil and gas industries for Russian 
economy (Ocelik et Osicka, 2014), demonstrating a principal unwillingness to modernize. 
Instead of any technological developments or a search for new markets or a better supply, 
the Russian elite, in particular Gazprom chief Alexei Miller (Gazprom, 2011)6, claimed that 
‘As for shale gas—it is an international PR campaign, well planned by mass media. There 
are plenty of those campaigns —global warming, biofuel, I can give other examples.’  
Finally, Russian soft power is limited mostly to the spoils of trade wars or the direct 
financing of certain politicians. This includes far-right parties in European Union countries 
or attempts to bribe those such as Victor Yanukovich with $15 billion of credit in order to 
make him reject any economic association with the EU. In fact, there have been no major 
                                                        
5 VCIOM. Press – release № 3010 (December, 27, 2015) 
Accessed 10th March, 2016 from  http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115531 
6 Gazprom, 2011d. Press Conference Following the Topical European Energy Issues Roundtable 
Discussion. Accesed 26 January 2016 from: 〈http://www. gazprom.com/f/posts/80/905737/krugly-stol-
stenogramma-eng-2011-02-21. pdf〉. 
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diplomatic achievements in recent Russian foreign policy – in 2014, at the UN, only 11 
countries out of 193 supported Russia in its case against Ukraine over the annexation of 
Crimea. Generally, according to the study of the Pew Research Center after Crimea’s 
annexation, ‘across the 44 countries surveyed, a median percentage of 43% have 
unfavorable opinions of Russia, compared with 34% who are positive. Negative ratings of 
Russia have increased significantly since 2013 in 20 of the 36 countries surveyed in both 
years, decreased in six and stayed relatively similar in the remaining 10’ (Pew Research 
Center, 2015, 3)7.  
Consequently, judging by the facts presented above, it is possible to agree with the 
idea that the ‘Russian Federation is an overachiever, enjoying a Great power status without 
having the capabilities of a Great power’ (Freire, 2011, p. 74). And according to the 
provisions of the national security strategy, such a status constitutes great value for the 
Russian leadership. The current regime seeks to maintain this status without making any 
real efforts in terms of the long-term development of the country, which leads to the 
question of what status as a ‘Great Power’ means for the current Russian leadership. 
It is presumed in the literature surrounding this question, that ‘Russia seeks to be 
respected as a great power because of deep seated beliefs about its own identity and its place 
in the world’ (Ambrosio, 2005, p. viii). Some scholars appealingly propose that under the 
Putin regime, status concerns have become more important than questions regarding 
security or the economy on Russia’s foreign policy agenda (Heller, 2013). Prominent 
scholars have developed an argument that the lack of status and respect is the crucial 
problem in Russia-West relations, and it is due to the lack of such recognition that crises of 
trust constantly emerge (Monaghan, 2008; Sakwa, 2008; Stent, 2014; Tsygankov, 2012). For 
instance, Vincent Pouliot suggests that ‘if NATO wants Russia to play by the rules of the 
security-from-the-inside-out game, it should provide it with enough cultural-symbolic 
resources to have a minimally successful hand in the game’ (Pouliot, 2010, p. 239).  Another 
example of such an approach is the position of Jeffrey Mankoff (Mankoff, 2007, p. 133), 
according to whom, ‘a Russia that is sure of itself and its standing in the world is likely to 
make a more stable, predictable partner for the West’. It is hard to disagree with such an 
approach, given that respect and recognition are purely in the realm of symbolic politics 
and do not require any material interests to be spent. However, such a position omits the 
very reasons as to why Vladimir Putin’s elite group places so much emphasis on the 
                                                        
7 Pew Research Centre. Russia’s Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine (July, 9, 2014) 
Accessed 10th March, 2016 from http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/09/russias-global-image-negative-
amid-crisis-in-ukraine/ 
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question of status and what they really want from it. In order to answer this question, one 
cannot rely solely on the framework of foreign policy and has to look at the tracks of 
Russian internal political development.  
The Russian Federation of today is by no means a democratic country. It is an 
electoral authoritarian regime. What is more, the position of the current ruling elite is the 
result of a long history of intra-elite struggle with all intra-elite conflicts being resolved as a 
zero-sum game during the first 12 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gelman, 
2015). As a result, by the mid-2000s, the governing group which had dealt with all its rivals 
had no incentives to limit the maximization of its powers since, ‘given the lack of 
constraints, [it was] able to achieve [its] goals in “pure” forms without major concessions’ 
(Gelman, 2015, 10). Consequently, since modern Russia is an authoritarian regime with 
elites having full control of it, it is crucial for foreign policy analysis to take into account the 
preferences of this group that rules Russia. 
Answering the question of what the elite’s beliefs are is not an easy task since it is 
principally impossible to understand what another person thinks in the entire complexity 
of his mind. However, judging from the information available, one can assume certain 
points. Concerning the portrait of the elites that won in this uncompromised rivalry, one 
may refer to Giorgi Yavlinski’s (Yavlinski, 2015, 249) description: ‘despite the attempts to 
bring ideology, appealing to the most primitive instincts, into their politics, this group [the 
ruling elite] in fact denies any societal values that go beyond individual well-being.’ The 
latter is a crucial point: every single moment of staying in power leads to the personal 
enrichment of the small group of Russian elite beneficiaries. Corruption in general can be 
conceptualized as a cornerstone of the modern Russian political system (Shlapentokh, 
2013). However, the elite group in such a regime can never feel totally secure. Taking that 
into account, the apparent paradox of contradiction between Russia’s foreign policy, the 
defensive nature of its National Security doctrine, and its ‘great power status’ concern can 
be answered.  
III. REGIME SECURITY IN THREAT 
Returning to the content of the national security strategy, it must be noted that the 
doctrine’s main narrative is the protection of internal security, which is threatened by 
external dangers with the help of the so-called ‘fifth column’. The central pillars of this 
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narrative are the notion of ‘political stability’ (art.30), the conceptualization of information 
as the means of toppling down the government (art. 21), and the necessity to ‘strengthen 
the internal unity of Russian society’ (art. 26).  
Such a narrative illustrates that the Russian ruling class is well aware of the role that 
popular movements, in the aftermath of unfair elections, played in the process of toppling 
down an authoritarian government in countries such as Serbia and Ukraine (Bunce and 
Wolchik, 2011; Beissinger, 2007) with at least moral support from the Western democracies. 
What is more, the fears of the Russian elite do have rational backing. As Adam Przeworski 
(Przeworski, 1991, 58) noted: ‘Authoritarian balance is underpinned by lies, fear and 
economic well-being.’ Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treysman have shown that in modern 
authoritarian regimes, the level of repression correlates with economic growth (Guriev, 
Treisman, 2015a; Guriev, Treisman, 2015b). However, one of the strategic disadvantages 
currently embedded in Russian authoritarianism is the inability to promote any kind of long-
term economic development. After 2012, as Vladimir Gel’man(Gel’man, 2015, 118)  points 
out ‘lies and fear, which had previously supported authoritarian equilibrium in Russia 
alongside economic growth, no longer served as efficient tools for maintaining the political 
status-quo.’ Both of these factors — the dependence on highly volatile natural resource 
exports and the decades-long deterioration of other sectors of industries and agriculture — 
were evident as early as 4 years ago. The point regarding predicted economic grievances 
should be stressed, as well as noting that the current crisis of the Russian economy is not a 
direct consequence of aggression against Ukraine and imposed western sanctions (Dreger, 
2015), but rather of the structural problems of an extreme dependence on oil and gas prices 
and the fact that industrial diversification is not highly developed (Eller, et.al, 2016).  
Such an economic model has made the Russian elite vulnerable in the face of public 
protests. The biggest one in modern Russian history erupted after the fraudulent 
parliamentary elections of 2011 and was finally suppressed with the help of brute force on 
May 6th, 2012. Despite that fact, the legitimacy of the ruling elite was not strong enough: 
even public polls, which are generally not the best method for measuring legitimacy, showed 
only moderate support for the government in 2012-2013. In August 2012, the approval 
ratings of Vladimir Putin were only 48% compared with 60% in May. His ratings were 
higher even during the time of ‘monetization of exemptions’ in 2005 – 55% respectively8. 
The position of the government could have been shaken in the case of deeper economic 
                                                        
8 Vedomosti.  Putin’s rating is on its bottom (April, 17, 2012) 
Accessed 10th March, 2016 from 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2012/08/17/rejting_putina_na_minimume 
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crisis and a collision of political and socio-economic protest, which can be conceptualized 
as the primary threat to regime security. There was a sudden demand for a new source of 
legitimacy, and the maintenance of a ‘Great Power Image’ can be considered an answer that 
the elite have found for this question.  
Traditionally, governments use the image of a superpower as a useful tool of 
promoting support in domestic policy (Merriman, 2004). Russia is certainly not an 
exception in that regard. In modern Russian history, an example of successful status 
acquisition was during the second Chechen war when, according to Hanna Smith (Smith, 
2014, 361), ‘national unity had given a boost to Russian self-confidence and Russian great 
power identity had found its place in Russian domestic discourse.’ However, by the end of 
2013, a decisive and aggressive foreign policy had turned into the only means available for 
the regime to defend the ‘great power image of the country’ against the background of 
economic decline and a collapse of state-structures, thereby providing citizens with the 
means of survival. Since the Russian elite seriously considers the possibility of external 
support for domestic protests, the genuine motives of the EU and the USA in their policies 
towards Russia are not that important. However, the incentive of the current Russian elite 
to remain in power at all costs is crucial for understanding modern Russian foreign policy 
in general, and the recent National Security strategy doctrine in particular. 
IV. GREAT POWER STATUS AND REGIME SECURITY 
The paradox of the Russian government conducting costly foreign policies of confrontation 
with the West and the operation in Syria, while simultaneously claiming ‘status concern’ as 
the long–term goal of the National Security Strategy Doctrine — against the background 
of the government’s primary concern of regime security — can be explained in the 
following way: the ‘status of a great power’ can be considered the core means of keeping 
the domestic audience under control, mobilizing support for the current Russian regime, 
and overcoming the internal threats to “political stability” (i.e. regime security).  
A further argument is the fact that, after the drop in oil prices and structural 
inefficiency of the Russian economic model, the development of a ‘great power status’ 
remained the only recourse left to the Russian government to gain the symbolic value 
necessary to promote such a status in the eyes of the population at home. And in fact, the 
Russian leadership has managed to achieve a lot with such a policy. The rise of patriotism 
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in Russia following Crimea’s annexation provided the regime with the uncharacteristic 
support it needed in the context of forthcoming deepening economic grievances. Following 
the current argument, the emphasis of the ‘image’ in article 18 of the Strategy Doctrine 
becomes the most important position for the current Russian leadership, which also 
explains why the document never clearly defines how such a ‘status’ should look. It is 
possible, in line with the main argument of this article, to argue that the more undefined 
and unclear the notion of ‘status’ is, the more useful it is for the objective purposes of 
manipulation of domestic public opinion.  
Moreover, it is possible to propose an answer to the question: ‘why does Russia use 
such strong language as presenting Western nations at one time as “brothers” and “friends,” 
while at other times castigating them for “betraying” the established principles and 
agreements?’ (Tsygankov, 2014, 347). Both aspects are purely instrumental and serve the 
sole purpose of achieving tactical goals. As a result, it does not make sense to try to 
understand modern Russian foreign policy just by looking into the words that Russian 
politicians put forth. Narratives can be reversed in a matter of weeks by propaganda means 
in order to justify the exact actions of the Russian leadership. The most recent story of 
turning Turkey from a strategic partner into the ‘traitorous enemy’ after the downing of a 
Russian fighter jet over Syria may serve as an illustration to this idea. Though this opens the 
way for another debate concerning the predictability of Russian foreign policy in particular, 
and of authoritarian regimes in general.  
Finally, it is possible to answer why, regardless of having a national security strategy 
oriented mostly towards the problems of domestic security, the current Russian leadership 
has been in recent years conducting a foreign policy oriented towards constant involvement 
in international crises. The Russian government has to perform the role of a great power in 
international relations in order to keep such a status in the eyes of its domestic audience. 
According to polls conducted in March 2015, 47% of respondents preferred that the 
country be a great power ‘respected and afraid of,’ for the sake of the country’s economic 
well-being9. In January 2016, against the background of a deepening economic crisis, 36% 
of the population considered Russia to be a great power in the world, compared with 27% 
in 201510. The fact is that, from the perspective of at least 30% of the Russian population, 
                                                        
9 Levada Center. Press-release “Positions of the Russian Federation on International Arena” (March, 23. 
2015) 
Accessed 10th March, 2016 from http://www.levada.ru/old/23-03-2015/pozitsii-rossii-na-
mezhdunarodnoi-arene 
10 Levada Center. Publication “Nearly half of Russians think that the West sees Russia as a concurrent” 
(February, 4, 2016) 
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Russia being considered an enemy by most developed countries does not weaken their pride 
for the motherland but instead strengthens it. Even admitting that the country is 
economically weak compared with the West, people are proud that at least in terms of 
foreign policy capacities, Russia seems to be on equal footing. And this is the value that 
turns into a markedly high approval rating of the Russian government. Consequently, by 
means of aggressive foreign policy, the Russian elite are trying to preserve the image of 
Russia being great power in order to guarantee the safety of the regime.  
CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the 2015 national security strategy doctrine, in the context of the complex 
structure of Russian domestic policy, allows a number of conclusions to be drawn. To begin 
with, there is only one objective purpose that the Russian leadership is genuinely committed 
to — in particular the prevention of a regime change, which is being achieved by keeping 
control over all political processes within the country. But in order to meet this goal, 
decision-makers must resort to aggressive foreign policy and a demonstration of military 
might in local conflicts. This is the comprehensive argument regarding Putin’s foreign 
policy. Neither the thesis of Hannes Adomeit (Adomeit, 1995, p. 65) that, ‘[a] Russia that 
is obsessed with its lost great power identity possesses many irrational, unpredictable, 
contradictory traits in its foreign policy’, nor the suggestion of Richard Sakwa that the 
‘Russian problem’ is not about a security dilemma, but rather a question of the status and 
respect from the West that it expects (Sakwa, 2008), covers the whole story. The Russian 
ruling elite does behave rationally, if the ultimate goal of this rationality is the preservation 
of the regime’s status and security. Since status, particularly international status, is the only 
means left to the authority against the background of economic failures and collapse of 
political institutions to keep control over power on the home front. At the same time, and 
due to the very nature of status as an issue created to a large extent by media and symbols, 
one can expect high flexibility of Russian foreign policy combined with low commitment 
to particular purposes. The crucial question for Russian authority becomes how to interpret 
its every action as a ‘status’ achievement.  
                                                        
 Accessed 10th March, 2016 from http://www.levada.ru/2016/02/04/pochti-polovina-grazhdan-schitayut-
chto-zapad-vidit-v-rossii-konkurenta/ 
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An analysis of the Russian national security doctrine leads to several important 
questions of the proper unit for analysis of modern Russian foreign policy. What is clear is 
that the traditional categories of “national interest” and “state security” are not applicable 
in the case of Russia. Usually (according to a realist approach), the discrepancy between 
national and ruling elite interests is impossible to separate, although in modern Russia the 
only interest that does matter is the maximization of power in the hands of a particular 
group. Consequently, the only aspect of analysis a researcher has to consider in regards to 
Russia is that concerning ‘regime security’.  
Finally, the findings of this article illustrate, in the case of the Russian security doctrine, 
the role that status concerns can perform in an authoritarian regime in times of systemic 
crisis. It can be conceptualized both as a guarantee against ‘foreign support’ for domestic 
protests, and as an ultimate means of gaining popular support for the government. Status 
is the recourse necessary to consolidate citizens and prevent domestic unrest. Such a reading 
can explain the evident paradox, since the Russian ruling elite want to enjoy great power 
status without any investment into the country’s long-term development both politically 
and economically.  
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